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clients were insurers, banks, and other financial
institutions. My job responsibilities and my ana-
lytical nature thoroughly taught me how to take
apart and analyze a financial institution. When I
reached a point in my life where I wanted to
actively contribute to public policy, it was only
natural that I focused on the federal government’s
own financial institutions. After extensive infor-
mational interviews with policymakers, it became
clear that these important institutions do not
receive nearly the attention that they deserve.
In consequence, I gathered together a board of
directors of like-minded policy experts and
founded the Center On Federal Financial Institu-
tions (COFFI). We are a nonpartisan, and non-
profit, think tank that focuses solely on federal
lending and insurance activities. You can find
out more at www.coffi.org.
We have carved out a role in educating policy-
makers, journalists, and the public about issues
surrounding these critically important institutions.
I
’d like to start by thanking the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis for sponsoring
this conference on a very important topic
that is dear to my heart, but is often neg-
lected by others. I was thrilled to hear about the
conference even before our hosts did me the
honor of inviting me to speak.
My talk today will be very different from the
brilliant economic analyses that you will likely
hear from the other speakers. It will be full of
personal opinions and observations rather than
mathematical logic or statistical analyses that can
be proven or disproven. In some ways it is a letter
from the front-lines where public policy, politics,
and bureaucracy clash. In consequence, you
deserve some explanation of who I am and from
where my opinions derive.
BACKGROUND
I was an investment banker for nearly two
decades, principally with J.P. Morgan, and my
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      We largely avoid advocacy of policy positions
because we believe this would risk alienating
some policymakers who would otherwise benefit
from a greater understanding of how these insti-
tutions actually work. We are still at the phase
of explaining that if you push this button, certain
things will happen, and if you pull that lever,
other things will happen. I will be a bit more opin-
ionated than that today, secure in the knowledge
that this audience does not need basic points
elucidated and hopeful that you will accept
our political neutrality. You can do so in some
confidence. 
For example, the New York Times referred to
our material as being “without a hint of dogma or
advocacy” as well as “refreshingly understand-
able.” Naturally, the opinions I express today are
my own and not those of COFFI.
I apologize if I seem to be more of a “man with
a mission” than the methodical, intellectual econ-
omists who are making the other presentations.
I believe three things passionately:
• Federal financial institutions are extremely
important in the lives of tens of millions
of Americans. $1.4 trillion of credit and
over $7 trillion of insurance make a big
difference, for good and ill, especially given
the focus of the programs on policy issues
important to our country. 
• These institutions do great good when run
well and great harm when run badly.
• Our nation needs your help. Some of the
most brilliant minds in this country are here
as speakers, and everyone here is involved
in setting the terms for public policy or in
executing those policies. The rest of my talk
will center on issues that I believe deserve
your attention.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
PLUMBER
To put my chosen focus in a broader context,
I would like to propose a metaphor, borrowed
from Bob Litan, one of my Board members and a
fellow speaker here. I am here as a plumber,
devoted to managing the massive liquidity that
is at the disposal of the federal government and
is directed toward so many policy goals. The other
speakers are the scientists and visionary engineers
who show us what can be done. I am grateful for
their important work, but sometimes it seems that
we collectively neglect the simpler things that
actually keep the fluids going where we want them
to go. Yet, we all know how bad things can get
when the plumbing breaks and we know the
feeling of helplessness when the water will not
come out of the tap.
Economists and political scientists have
written great analyses examining the circum-
stances under which the federal government might
usefully be in the business of lending money or
insuring risks. This research matters a great deal
because it is an important factor in framing how
policymakers think about proposed new federal
financial institutions. It helps filter out bad ideas
and encourages good ones, although it will always
be true that political considerations are likely to
play the predominant role in the final decisions.





However, my primary interest lies at a different
level, beneath the existential questions of whether
these institutions should be here. The federal
government has a long history as a lender and
insurer, and there is no sign that this is going to
change. If anything, concerns about the federal
budget deficit are likely to encourage an expansion
of these programs. Lending and insurance pro-
grams allow politicians to throw out multibillion
dollar figures for the volume of good their pro-
posals will provide, without having the budget
cost approach those levels. This is especially true
if politicians use overly optimistic figures for the
proportion of borrowers who will actually pay the
loans back or the proportion of insureds who will
submit claims. There are not a lot of other areas
in the government where you can propose a pro-
gram that directs $10 billion to some sector and
claim at the same time that it will directly make
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the budget scoring might back you up.
Even if new programs are not introduced, it
is a very rare occasion when an existing federal
financial institution slides off into the sunset.
Doubtless, this is sometimes because the under-
lying need remains, but in other cases it is probably
more a function of the creation of constituencies
who come to value an existing program. Politicians
are very aware that it is much easier to withhold
something in the first place than it is to take
something back.
So it seems that the federal government is
likely to remain a massive lender and insurer
indefinitely. Given this, it behooves us to make
sure that these financial institutions are run well.
Notice my constant references to “financial insti-
tutions.” I strongly believe that one of the under-
lying reasons for financial crises and chronic
underperformance at some of these institutions is
that their structures were established with insuf-
ficient regard for how they would function as a
financial institution. There is a strong tendency in
Washington to focus on the grander policy issues,
such as ensuring access to a college education, and
to assume that creating a financial institution will
naturally follow in an optimal manner. Therefore,
the pension insurance system was designed by
pension experts, student lending by education
experts, etc. Of course, the specific policy expert-
ise is critical, but it needs to be leavened with an
understanding of financial institutions. Otherwise
bad things can, and do, happen.
Most of the key issues to be discussed fall into
one of four categories: structure, budget rules,
human resources, and management tools.
STRUCTURE
The failure to think about programs as finan-
cial institutions can be very harmful if it results
in a flawed structure. 
Federal Communications Commission
Spectrum Auction
An extreme example of this is the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum
auction that occurred in the midst of the late,
lamented bubble. The federal government deter-
mined that parts of the radio spectrum could be
turned over to the private sector and that the most
effective way to do this was through an auction.
This may have been an excellent general idea, but
appended to it was an egregious flaw. Congress
wished to ensure that smaller businesses and
minorities not be locked out of the bidding
because of difficulty in finding up-front funding.
Again, in itself this may have been a very laudable
goal. However, almost as an afterthought, it was
determined that the FCC should agree to accept
installment payments from small and minority-
owned businesses that met certain criteria.
What this meant was that the FCC, with no
previous experience as a lender, was now going
to effectively lend certain bidders the money to
buy the spectrum they desired. Thus, Congress
set up a multibillion dollar lending operation
from scratch and without much consideration of
the optimal structure. The actual structure con-
tained many risky features:
• The borrowers generally were betting the
success of their companies on the use of
their particular spectrum. Therefore, the
program’s role basically was to provide
project finance, which is riskier than general
lending. 
• There was little lending expertise at the
FCC.
• Borrowers were targeted based on their
likely difficulty in attracting private
finance. 
• There was little requirement for equity to
exist at the bidding firms, but installments
were priced as if they were true loans.
Every smart lender knows that calling some-
thing a “loan” is much less important in
reducing risk than ensuring that someone
else takes the first loss. Many a project has
been pitched to lenders as “borrowing,”
when it is apparent that the risk is basically
equity risk and should have been priced
that way. 
I should stress that it was not necessarily
wrong to set up a program that took on certain of
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market-access problems. It is the combination of
these structural risks that compounded to danger-
ous levels.
The results were sadly predictable. The bubble
burst after the auctions were completed but before
most of the installment payments were made.
This might not have mattered as much if the FCC’s
new unit had nailed down the ability to take back
spectrums. There would have been an opportunity
cost from reselling spectrum under less propi-
tious market conditions, but this still would have
provided substantial recoveries. Instead, compa-
nies that collapsed have been able to retain con-
trol of their spectrum in bankruptcy, leaving the
federal government as one more unhappy creditor.
Proper thought given to this program as a
financial institution would undoubtedly have
raised questions that would have led to a superior
structure. I know that the Office of Management
and Budget raised objections to the approach that
was ultimately followed, but various political and
bureaucratic issues trumped their logic.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Another example of a failure to focus on the
nature of an entity as a financial institution is the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
This is a less clearcut example in some ways, since
there was considerable discussion of certain insur-
ance principles from the beginning, including the
need to have some risk remain with employees
and retirees in order to reduce moral-hazard issues.
Yet, the outcome was still to design an insurer
with structural risks, including the following:
• No ability to choose clients. All corporate
pension funds with certain minimal char-
acteristics were insured.
• Overall price levels were fixed on an ad
hoc basis. I’m told that, back in 1974, the
pension insurance premium was going to
be set at 50 cents per participant per year,
based on a study of historical losses that
did not take into account likely changes in
behavior once there was a federal insurer.
In the end, it was bumped up to a dollar per
participant because an important senator
just thought that it was worth having a
margin for error and that a round dollar
sounded right. It is hard to imagine this kind
of ad hoc decision, or the earlier mentioned
structural problems, if the establishment
of a federal financial institution were seen
as more than an ancillary activity.
• Prices initially did not vary with risk levels
and still have only a loose relationship to
risk.
• No meaningful regulatory authority.
Regulatory power often substitutes for the
lack of an ability to choose whether to take a
client and how much to charge. Mandating
certain operational and financial standards
can reduce risks to levels more appropriate
to the premiums charged. Private sector
banks do this by insisting on loan covenants
that give them great leverage if a company
deterioriates too far. The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act does set
down certain standards of behavior for pen-
sion funds, but the regulatory power is at
the Department of Labor and the Internal
Revenue Service, not the PBGC.
• Little authority to negotiate workouts with
troubled insureds. Private lenders naturally
prefer not to lend to firms that will become
troubled, but they recognize that conces-
sions are often necessary when a company
does fall on hard times. More-lenient terms
are combined with tough requirements to
fix operating and financial problems. The
PBGC’s ability to effectively negotiate such
a workout is very limited.
As with the FCC example, let me stress that
structural issues must be looked at in combination.
Sometimes a structural risk is justified by other
policy objectives but becomes excessively danger-
ous in tandem with another risk.
THE NEED FOR NEW 
“COMMANDMENTS”
It would be a real step forward if we could
persuade Congress to establish a statutory require-
Elliott
262 JULY/AUGUST 2006 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWment that any new federal financial institution
must have a business plan that addresses a number
of key structural issues. Admittedly, it would be
difficult to enforce quality standards for these
business plans, but bureaucrats and politicians
do not like writing things down that will sound
stupid later. Putting words on paper and having
them reviewed can often help avoid the worst
potential problems. By the way, I do not mean to
suggest that the private sector is any better when
dealing with seemingly peripheral issues where
no one is reviewing the thinking. Having worked
on Wall Street for almost 20 years, I have heard a
lot of stupid ideas. It’s just that private financial
institutions and markets have many built-in
checks that cause most ideas to be reviewed by
people with a monetary stake in the outcome.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
generally opines already on the creation or signifi-
cant revision of federal financial institutions.
However, statutory authority would significantly
increase their institutional ability to resist bad
structures. Besides, the OMB is stretched thin and
it would be better to eliminate many of the bad
ideas before they reach that agency, to minimize
the chance that some will slip through. I do not
mean to neglect the role of the Congressional
research arms, such as the Government Account-
ability Office, the Congressional Budget Office,
and the Congressional Research Service. However,
they also have serious resource and institutional
constraints that limit their ability to completely
filter out bad structural ideas.
Let me say again that I understand that 
politics, in a democratic system, always has the
potential to overcome financial expertise—and
sometimes even common sense. However, I also
believe that a systematic discipline can avoid
many errors.  A happy example of this is the
Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, the budget
rules that have guided federal lending activity
for over a decade.
Budget Rules
Budget rules are a very powerful way of influ-
encing behavior in any large organization, espe-
cially one with few binding external constraints.
Prior to the implementation of the Act in 1992,
federal credit programs faced the same budget
rules as other federal programs. If a dollar of cash
went out as a loan, it looked on the budget pretty
much the same as if a grant were made with that
dollar or part of a weapons system were bought.
Similarly, receiving a dollar in repayment had the
same effect as collecting a dollar in taxes or user
fees. Needless to say, this simplistic approach
created major distortions in government decision-
making because lending is a multiyear activity
that needs to be viewed that way. The practical
problems often stemmed from the strong political
incentives to minimize budget costs in the near-
term, particularly the first year, even if long-term
costs were increased. Three distortions stand out:
• There was a significant disincentive to
expand even worthy direct loan programs.
The new outlays would hit the budget in
the politically critical first year, whereas
the offsetting repayments would be years
in the future. It is interesting to remember
that President Johnson first sold part of
Fannie Mae to the private sector partly to
take the growing program off-budget.
Whether that was a good or a bad decision,
it was too important to be decided as a
result of bad budget rules.
• Incentives existed to destroy economic
value by taking certain actions that raised
a great deal of cash up-front. For instance,
packaging government loans together and
selling them to the private sector at a dis-
tinct economic loss would still reduce the
near-term budget deficit by bringing in cash.
This is not to say that loan sales were nec-
essarily uneconomical, but rather to point
out a structural bias.
• Cash budgeting heavily tilted the playing
field in favor of loan guarantees, even when
direct loans made more programmatic
sense. Loan guarantees were essentially
costless in their first year, since defaults
rarely occur that quickly. They could even
show an initial profit if there were an
upfront guarantee fee that more than cov-
ered administrative expenses.
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use of “revolving funds” as the basis for many loan
programs. Congress would start a program with an
appropriation to its revolving fund, which would
be used to fund loans. Loan repayments and inter-
est went back into the revolving fund and could
be lent out again, without further Congressional
action. Many advocates of credit reform felt that
this excessively limited Congressional scrutiny
and control of loan programs.
The Federal Credit Reform Act completely
changed the rules, in an attempt to level the play-
ing field between loans, guarantees, credit insur-
ance, and grants. A projection is made of future
cash flows for each year of new credit authority.
These cash flows are then discounted back at the
zero coupon government borrowing rate for bonds
maturing in the same year as the cash flow. The
net present value shows up as a subsidy expense
on the budget, assuming the value of outflows
exceeds that of inflows. If the inflows are worth
more, then a negative subsidy is shown, equiva-
lent to revenue dollars from other sources. It is
worth noting that administrative expenses are not
included in the subsidy calculations but continue
to be budgeted on an annual cash basis. Congress
has been reluctant to give up specific control over
administrative costs.
There is a strong consensus among budget
experts that the Federal Credit Reform Act has
improved decisionmaking, as would be expected.
There is always room for gamesmanship in any
budgeting process, as well as room for ignorance
and misunderstanding, but this law clearly acts
as a restraint on bad decisions and as a subtle
encouragement for good ones.
Nonetheless, this is an area to which I would
like to devote a considerable part of my time here
today because there are a number of practical
questions for which we could use the help of top
economic thinkers.  Some of these questions may
seem to have obvious answers, but that is precisely
my larger point. There is often a great lag between
advances in economic thinking and when these
concepts become part of the policymaking process.
Indeed, it may sometimes seem as if there is a
disconnect rather than simply a time lag. We need
help making the case for sound economics and
well-considered thinking on how answers that
were formulated primarily for private financial
institutions may need to be modified for the public
sector. This latter point is important because many
in Washington assume that answers developed
for private sector institutions are not likely to be
valid in the public sector. They are sometimes
right in that concern, and so our analysis needs
to consider that factor.
Discount Rates and Floating-Rate Loans
Let me start with what seems like an easy
question. What discount rate should we use for
a floating-rate loan made by the government?
The Federal Credit Reform Act indicates that the
“effective maturity” should be used in determin-
ing the appropriate discount rate. This has gen-
erally been interpreted, in the traditional sense
of maturity, as being the point in time when the
money is repaid. The student loan programs are
the main federal credit programs that use floating-
rate loans, and the final maturity on these loans
tends to be about 10 years, although it varies con-
siderably. The lending rate is based on a 91-day
Treasury-bill rate but is reset only once per year,
not every quarter. Currently, this is scored for
budget purposes in the same way—as if there were
a series of payments based on a fixed rate. That
is, the principal and interest payments expected
in year one are discounted with a 1-year T-bill
rate, the second year’s payments with a 2-year
rate, etc. (We will return later to the question of
whether the government’s cost of funds should
be used, as it is now, or whether a risk-adjusted
rate would be more appropriate.)
This has raised the analytical question as to
whether it would be more appropriate to use a
discount rate based on short-term interest rates
rather than using a rate based on the final maturity
of the loan. There was little or no discussion in
Congress of this issue when the Federal Credit
Reform Act of 1990 was passed, in part because
there were no significant floating-rate lending
programs at that point. (Student loans were still
offered on a fixed-rate basis at that time.) There
has been discussion of this issue periodically since
then, including in the early days of the Direct
Lending program, but no changes have been made.
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approach. As noted above, Congress has chosen
to use the government’s cost of funds as the basis
for the discount rates. Congress further chose to
define the cost of funds not as the actual borrowing
rate experienced by the Treasury Department for
a particular program, but as the borrowing rate
that eliminated any interest rate risk on a fixed-
rate loan. That is, the rate on a 10-year govern-
ment borrowing is used as the discount rate for a
payment 10 years in the future, even if the likeli-
hood is that the Treasury Department would
finance the 10 years through a series of shorter-
term borrowings that were rolled over. Regulators,
financial markets, and financial economists agree
that this is the least-risky way to finance a future
payment.
Similar logic would suggest that the least-
risky way to finance a floating-rate lending pro-
gram would be to borrow at a floating rate with
similar characteristics. That is, funding the student
loan program through 91-day T-bills would pro-
duce future interest costs that would most closely
match the expected interest receipts. (The most
precise match would have to take account of the
fact that the rate is a 91-day rate but is only reset
once per year. The best fit might therefore be an
instrument a bit longer than the 91-day T-bill,
although not as long as the 1-year T-bill.)
This funding pattern might not intuitively
seem to be the least-risky choice, since the cost
of funds would be considerably more variable
than locking in a 10-year fixed rate. However, this
looks at only one-half of the equation. Congress
presumably cares about the net cost of the program,
which is determined by the difference between
the lending rate and the cost of funds. This differ-
ence is highly volatile today because the 10-year
bond rate can move significantly differently from
the 91-day T-bill rate. Using the same rate for both
would eliminate this source of volatility.
Congress appears to make decisions as if the
discount rate were the actual underlying cost of
funds. On that basis, evaluating the floating-rate
student loan program by using a 10-year fixed rate
is equivalent to a private lender borrowing long
term and lending short term. Lenders sometimes
do this for pieces of their overall portfolio as an
explicit interest rate bet, but it is considered irre-
sponsible if applied as a consistent strategy to
the whole firm. 
For a private lender, this mismatch would
produce major swings in profitability. For the
government, the mismatch between the basis for
determining the discount rate and the interest rate
paid by students has produced similar oscillations
in the budget cost of student lending. These
swings could be dampened sharply by eliminating
the artificial mismatch in the federal budget.
A friend of mine who is a respected financial
economist believes strongly that a floating rate
would be more appropriate economically, but is
frustrated in proving this to policymakers because
there is so little written on the subject. The prob-
lem seems too simple for a research journal, given
that this question is a settled one for private sector
firms, even though it is important and not settled
in the real policy world. We could use your help
in showing that the private sector analysis applies
here, or that it needs to be modified, or even that
the current budgeting approach is actually right
for reasons unique to government budgeting.
The issue of using a floating discount rate has
important real-world implications. Switching to
its use would likely trigger two policy changes,
assuming normal yield curves prevail. First, it
would tend to be more favorable to direct lending
by the federal government, in comparison with
guaranteed lending by the private sector, than is
true under today’s rules. The direct loan program
experiences upfront cash outflows when the
government makes a loan, which are offset by
receipts spread over many years. In contrast,
the guaranteed loan program has payments and
receipts that are more mixed over time. This tim-
ing differential makes the direct loan program
much more sensitive to discount rates than is
the guaranteed loan program. This provides two
disincentives for direct lending: (i) The average
long-term discount rate is likely higher than a
floating rate would be and (ii) current rules create
the mismatch that I described, resulting in budget
volatility. Congress does not like volatility of
budget costs any more than private sector firms
like volatile profits. The other major effect would
be to lower the average budget cost of student
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would likely result in the authorization of higher
volumes of lending.
Discount Rates and Risk Adjustments
The second question that I will highlight may
also seem simple, depending on your viewpoint,
but has even greater implications for federal lend-
ing. Should the federal government use a discount
rate that reflects the uncertainty of future cash
flows from a lending program? Congress made
the decision in 1990 to base the discount rate on
the federal government’s cost of funds rather than
on a risk-adjusted basis. Unlike the floating-rate
question, there was a great deal of discussion on
this point, to which I may not do full justice, as I
was not involved in the debate.
The arguments for a risk-adjusted rate were
largely modeled on the arguments that have pre-
vailed in economic analysis of private sector finan-
cial institutions. Essentially, debt and equity
investors are risk-averse and therefore require a
higher return from activities that have uncertain
future cash flows. This is captured with discount
rates by using a higher discount rate for riskier
expected cash flows. A variation of this argument
that focuses on the allocation of public resources
suggests that if the interest rate for all borrowers
is held constant in a lending program, more value
is being provided to a high-risk borrower than to
a low-risk borrower, if for no other reason than
that their private sector alternative borrowing rate
would be higher. This is useful to know for two
reasons. First, it is desirable to keep track of where
we are allocating valuable resources. Second,
the value to the recipient means that there is an
opportunity cost to the government in failing to
charge the full amount that the borrower would
be willing to pay and this opportunity cost varies
with the riskiness of the borrower.
The theoretical arguments for using a govern-
ment rate include the contention that the govern-
ment is an entity with an almost infinite ability
to spread costs over time and across large numbers
of taxpayers and wide ranges of activities. This
diversification ability is so wide that the uncer-
tainty of any particular cash flow is insignificant
and therefore there need be no extra charge.
Essentially, everything will average out without
creating problems.
A counter to this argument is that taxpayers,
like shareholders, are the holders of residual risk.
Taxpayers may indeed be comfortable ignoring
unsystematic risk, but should wish to be paid for
systematic risk, such as the business cycle risk
inherent in Small Business Administration (SBA)
loans. Arguments that taxpayers should not care
about lending risk would therefore hold up only
if they would work equally well if we were talking
about shareholders in an analogous situation.
Another argument in favor of using govern-
ment borrowing rates hinges on the contention
that there is a difference between a budget and
an economic analysis. This has two variations.
First, if we view budgeting as more of an account-
ing exercise, then it is the borrowing rates of the
government that matter, not the theoretical costs.
The further argument is that these borrowing rates
are not much affected by the volatility of cash
flows. Second, some argue that it is more impor-
tant to avoid budgeting gamesmanship by using
a rate we can all look up than it is to get the pre-
cisely right economic rate.
There are big implications for public policy,
and for politics, that depend on the outcome of
this debate. Use of risk-adjusted rates would tend
to lower the amount of federal credit activity
because any risk-adjusted rate would be higher
than the government’s cost of borrowing. Every
credit program would, by definition, have a higher
budget cost or a lower benefit. This point was cer-
tainly not lost on the politicians who ultimately
decided what to put into the Federal Credit Reform
Act, and I am morally certain that it was a major
underlying reason for the choice of the govern-
ment’s borrowing rate as the discount rate.
The other effect of changing to a risk-adjusted
discount rate could well be to decrease the politi-
cal attractiveness of lending to higher-risk borrow-
ers, unless interest rates on the loans themselves
were also increased. I should note that riskier
borrowers already have a higher budget cost
because the best estimate of their credit defaults
is above that for other borrowers. However, use
of an increased discount rate would add to this
difference.
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Intertwined with questions concerning opti-
mal budget rules is a need for good measures of
lending effectiveness. These will probably vary
with the underlying policy issue addressed by
the lending program, but perhaps we can find a
few common metrics. I am sure there are whole
textbooks on cost-benefit analysis that could be
consulted, but one of the keys to dealing effec-
tively with policymakers is to find measurements
that are simple and intuitively appealing. (Again,
I’m not sure this is that different in the private
sector. I did much better with CEO’s and top offi-
cials of insurers and banks when I could show
them the likely effect of an action on a simple
metric, like return on assets, than when I tried to
get much fancier.)
I have been wrestling with appropriate metrics
relating to the SBA. Currently, there is a disconnect
between what policymakers give as the reasons
for the existence of the SBA and the measures
that politicians use in practice. Many who defend
the SBA on policy grounds point to perceived
market failures that channel too little money to
minorities and to high-risk ventures that could
have major positive externalities—the next Google,
for example. In essence, they see private sector
lending as having a tendency to play it too safe,
whether that is an actual difference of risk or one
produced by discriminatory perceptions.
Unfortunately, politicians seem to impose a
combination of two metrics that produces the
same result within the SBA. They want as high a
lending volume as possible at as low a budget cost
as possible. Ideally, each of their constituents
would borrow $10,000, but the budget cost would
be zero. There is a way to maximize this combined
objective: lend large volumes, but only to busi-
nesses that clearly have the resources to pay the
SBA back. Unfortunately, minority businesses
and high-risk ventures are not likely to fall into
these categories. Some minority businesses would
qualify as low risk, but discrimination in our
society produces risks that disproportionately
handicap these businesses. After all, the very
reason that policymakers want the SBA to focus
on minorities is because they have more trouble
getting financing from conventional sources. Lack
of access to private market funds is itself a risk
factor because a future cash need could arise that
the SBA could not or would not be willing to fill.
What we need is a way to measure either the
net gain to society from allocating resources to
deserving borrowers who were not getting them,
or at least a way to measure the benefit to the
borrowers in terms of greater access or lower cost.
We may not really need an SBA if all it is going
to do is to lend at a few basis points less than
borrowers would have paid for money they could
have obtained without the SBA.
It may be that the only answer is a full-
fledged cost-benefit analysis of some kind, but it
would be very helpful if there were a simple
way of approximating the same result. Simple
measures, even if crude, can be preferable in
some circumstances.
I have focused here on the SBA, but the same
types of questions can be raised for any lending
program where there is a measure of choice in
who receives a loan or where there is a question
as to whether to add a category of borrowers. It is
a less pressing issue with student loans or other
programs that take all comers who meet a fairly
wide set of criteria.
Simplifying Models and Data
Requirements
This leads me naturally to another general
question. Is there a way to simplify some of the
more advanced techniques so that data estimation
and input problems do not overwhelm the theo-
retical advantages? There is always a practical
tension in modeling between the desire to incor-
porate greater realism through additional vari-
ables, and a finer division of categories and time
periods, versus the need to strive for an elegant
simplicity. For the first years after passage of the
Federal Credit Reform Act, the big modeling issues
seemed to involve persuading agencies to make the
commitment to model in sufficient detail and to
capture the data necessary for the basic analysis.
I have started to sense that some government
departments have now overshot in the other
direction, adding more variables because they can
rather than because they make a significant differ-
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a bureaucracy, private or public, for at least two
reasons. First, it is safer to be able to say that a
variable has been taken into account than it is to
argue that it is not important. Second, there is an
advantage sometimes in having a model so com-
plicated that no one can dispute your conclusions.
Clarity may not always be seen as a virtue.
This temptation probably cannot be elimi-
nated, but it may be that economists can help us
focus on some key variables that ought to be con-
sidered or statistical techniques that would help
us capture the essence of a financial institution.
Budgeting for Insurance Programs
Perhaps I have already been in Washington too
long, but I would now like to expand my empire
beyond my stated mandate of federal credit pro-
grams by talking a little about federal insurance
activities. The big theoretical question is, How
can we improve federal budgeting for insurance
programs? There was a plan to follow up the
Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 by expanding
the concepts to include insurance. This fell
through, and we have continued to use the current
inadequate system of cash budgeting.
Cash budgeting for insurance activities is a
disaster, in my opinion. Let me give you two
examples. 
PBGC. Exhibit A is the PBGC. At last count,
it was $23 billion in the hole and digging deep-
er every day, according to generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP), which appear
to reflect the PBGC’s economics quite well.
However, the cumulative effect of the PBGC on
the federal budget, since it came on-budget in
the early 1980s, is a $12 billion contribution to
deficit reduction. There is a $35 billion difference
between these two numbers, and they have oppo-
site signs.
Here’s how it happened. The federal budget
essentially treats the PBGC as if it were two enti-
ties. There is an on-budget revolving fund that
takes in all premiums and earns investment
income on those premiums. There is an off-budget
quasi-trust fund that represents all of the assets
taken over from failed pension funds and the
investment earnings on those assets. Pension
payouts come partially from the revolving fund
and partially from the quasi-trust. The proportion
is based on the original funding ratio of the pen-
sion plan for which the check is being paid. If a
company’s plan was 60 percent covered by its
assets when the PBGC took over, then 60 percent
of the pension checks paid out for their retirees
come from the quasi-trust and the rest from the
revolving fund. Other expenses are split on a for-
mula basis that is managed so that almost all
expenses are covered from the off-budget quasi-
trust and do not contribute to the federal deficit.
Pension payments are very long-term obliga-
tions, so the PBGC is collecting large premiums
now to build up a reserve to eventually pay all of
the pensions for the claims it has taken on. This
means that for many years the cash inflows from
these premiums have more than offset the early
years of pension payments.
The PBGC’s excellent GAAP reporting has
helped to highlight its problems and is one of the
reasons why Congress is close to acting to reduce
the ultimate problem by increasing premiums and
forcing higher levels of pension funding. However,
I firmly believe that, if the PBGC’s effect on the
federal budget had shown the same pattern of
increasing GAAP deficits, there would have been
action earlier. It was around April Fool’s Day only
last year that Congress actually loosened funding
requirements by raising the discount rate used
for funding calculations and allowing airlines
and steel companies to put in only 20 percent of
their annual minimum required contributions. If
this had been seen to raise the short-term risk of
a significant hit to the budget, there might have
been a more serious examination of the desirabil-
ity of the funding changes. Perhaps it was the
right public policy outcome or perhaps politics
would have forced it through even if it were not,
but at least the issues would have been addressed.
Flood Insurance. Flood insurance is another
example of the perils of cash accounting for
insurance. The National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP) is the only flood insurance provider for
most homes in flood-prone areas. Premiums are
deliberately subsidized for older structures, so
that about a quarter of all flood insurance policies
are charged a rate roughly 40 percent of the best
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insurer’s actuarial review suggest that the subsidy
amounted to $1.3 billion last year. The other
three-quarters of the structures, mostly newer,
are charged actuarially derived rates that are
intended to cover the expected cost of all future
flood events, including the most catastrophic.
For comparison, total premiums for the program
amounted to $2 billion last year, so the subsidy
rate for the entire program would be over one-
third on an economic basis, despite the fact that
many subprograms bear no subsidy at all.
It happens that, until this year, the flood
insurance program was lucky enough not to have
suffered the kind of massive flooding that resulted
from Hurricane Katrina or even something a notch
or two smaller but still huge. Thus, the NFIP could
proclaim that it charged sufficient premiums to
pay for a “historical average loss year,” even
though it also stated that there were substantial
subsidies to one group and that the other group
paid actuarially fair rates (which implies no over-
payment to make up for the subsidies on the other
group). It also proudly reported that since the
early 1980s it had never been a drain on the tax-
payer, except for three borrowings that it had
paid back with interest.
There is something wrong when a government
agency can be explicitly subsidizing premiums by
$1.3 billion while presenting itself as being break-
even and no drain on the taxpayer. Obviously, the
circle is squared by the fact that insurers against
catastrophic losses who charge actuarially fair
premiums make money 9 years out of 10 and lose
most of it back in the 10th year. In the NFIP’s case,
it was more like 34 years out of 35, but this current,
35th year is a doozy. Hurricane Katrina will cost
the program $23 billion, compared with a figure
of $14 billion for all previous claims since incep-
tion in 1969, not adjusted for inflation. This far
exceeds the program’s capacity to pay and will
certainly come principally from taxpayers.
“Credit Reform” for Insurance
There seems to be a fairly strong consensus
among budget policy analysts that there does need
to be an equivalent to the Federal Credit Reform
Act for federal insurance activities. However,
there is also concern for how to design such a
system so that it precludes an excessive level of
gamesmanship. I have spoken with prominent
budget experts who would be very scared to let
agencies start using probability analysis with
relatively unpredictable insurance risks. What
should one do about terrorism risk insurance, for
example? Private insurers argue strongly that the
risk is uninsurable in the first place partly because
it is too difficult to ascribe probabilities to poten-
tial attacks. Do we want government agencies
trying this at home?
My own view is consistent with a comment
from Lord Keynes, which I will paraphrase, “a
bad measurement on sound principles is better
than no measurement at all.” We effectively use
measurements at or close to zero for these events
now. It seems sounder and more conservative to
use a positive, probabilistic estimate.
If we had adopted this approach earlier, the
debate about the last loosening of pension funding
rules would have required a discussion of the
probable loss to the PBGC. Congress could always
have fudged the analysis, but I would much rather
have a standard set of rules that made some sense
and force them to be explicitly overridden if pol-
itics intervenes. I want inertia to be our friend,
not our enemy, because there is certainly enough
of it around, and not just in the public sector.
The flood insurance numbers would even
more certainly have been accurate. The data is
already there, as I noted, in the actuarial review
and much of it is based on technical, engineering
estimates. Good budgeting would have highlighted
the figure rather than obscured it.
To repeat, a budget reform act for federal
insurance programs would be very helpful. The
economics profession could do a real public
service by helping to shape the principles under
which such an act would operate and to raise the
visibility of the issue so that policymakers will
view it as a priority. 
It may be worth underlining the obvious,
which is that there will be political opposition.
Right now the budget costs appear lower than
the economic costs would be. Every decade or so
the costs shoot up as a catastrophe hits, but that,
as we are seeing once again, is the easiest time to
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costs for the large majority of years and shockingly
high costs in the occasional year that you can
blame on Mother Nature.
PEOPLE AND TOOLS
I started this talk with a focus on overall
structural issues for federal financial institutions
and then segued to budgeting issues. Structure
and budget together carry a very heavy weight of
responsibility for the success of any public insti-
tution, especially in the absence of a private finan-
cial market to provide another kind of discipline.
However, there is more to running a financial
institution than this. It takes people and it takes
tools to make the institutions run.
Human Resources
Unfortunately, there are some human
resources issues that are important but difficult
to resolve. The most basic is that government
service is considerably less lucrative than work-
ing for a private sector financial institution. Many
arms of government face this difficulty, but it is
particularly acute for the federal financial insti-
tutions, simply because similar skills fetch so
much more in the private sector. 
This problem is not unique to the public
sector. The rating agencies, for example, need
employees with excellent finance skills, but are
not in a position to pay as much as investment
banks or the more sophisticated commercial banks.
The solution they have developed is to find ways
to retain a relatively small senior staff, who can
maintain the culture and quality standards, while
organizing the rest of the work so that it can be
performed by younger analysts who will remain
for a few years at a time. The rating agencies end
up serving as one of the training grounds for bud-
ding bankers and equities analysts.
Government financial institutions can often
obtain quite talented staff for positions with real
prestige and authority, but only with the implicit
understanding that the new hire will probably
only stay for two years and then move to the pri-
vate sector to exploit their government experience
and new connections. This biennial pattern is
so common that it is sometimes referred to as a
“Mormon Mission,” since most adult males in
that church go off for two-year missionary stints
once in their life.
This turnover is an issue, but the more difficult
problem is probably at the levels starting just
below these more prestigious positions. There is
a real need for financial sophistication, but it is
not structurally easy to provide the requisite train-
ing and it is even harder to retain employees once
they have those valuable skills.
We could use the advice of labor economists
on this one. I have wondered if it would be bene-
ficial to have a Certificate in Government Financial
Institutions Management that would require a spe-
cific set of training, but would entitle employees
to higher pay. Congress is very leery of increasing
pay, but is more likely to be convinced by a pay-
for-skills trade-off than by a simple increase for
financial institutions employees. Government
doctors and certain employees of bank regulatory
agencies have higher compensation limits, so
there is some scope for adjustment.
Management Tools
There is also a problem that most federal
financial institutions have too low a ratio of
capital to labor. This is a serious deficiency
because there has been a whole revolution in the
financial services industry in the private sector
in the last couple of decades. Much more infor-
mation is now collected on each borrower, and
loan and statistical techniques have been honed
to understand how to market, price, and manage
loans. Management systems have evolved to
ensure every advantage is wrung from this greater
understanding.
Unfortunately, Congress persists in viewing
administrative expenses as a bad thing, rather
than considering what the best trade-off might
be between expenses and total profit or loss.
Switching to the insurance side for a moment,
many of the private property-casualty insurers
that I have admired most have focused on inten-
sive, and expensive, underwriting and manage-
ment. They have accepted higher expense ratios,
recognizing that the more important ratio was
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client selection and pricing.
Once again, by the way, there is a budget
process issue that exacerbates the basic problem.
The net-present-value calculations that I described
earlier for calculating the budget effects of federal
lending activity explicitly do not include admin-
istrative expenses. Congress wished to maintain
its control of the annual appropriations process
for expenses rather than having future expenses
be projected as part of the net-present-value cal-
culations. As a result, investments in systems that
should reduce future expenses still show up as a
hit to the budget deficit now, without any imme-
diate benefit from the expected future savings. 
The unwillingness to invest in systems may
be a chicken and egg type problem, since I under-
stand that many of the computer systems that were
supposed to bring government departments into
modernity have instead cost large sums of money
to little purpose. Nonetheless, I believe that appro-
priate software and management tools must be
brought into the federal financial institutions,
even if the transition is at times a painful one.
CONCLUSIONS
My summation will be brief. 
• Federal financial institutions are
extremely important.
• Not enough attention is paid to them.
• Too much of the advice policymakers
receive comes from vested interests and
too little from objective sources.
• Developing clear answers to a series of
analytical questions would provide firmer
guidance to those policymakers and reduce
policy errors.
• We all need to help. Theorists can focus
on answering those questions that are
genuinely open and on explaining the
answers to those that are known. Practi-
tioners can redouble their efforts to apply
sound principles to specific issues. Both
groups need to talk more to the other.
• Finally, I highly recommend
www.coffi.org. We welcome your sugges-
tions as to how we can be more helpful to
policymakers, journalists, and the inter-
ested public.
Thank you very much.
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